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Martin King Whyte 
 
 
 
A central claim of most theories of economic development is that a key to successful 
growth is “getting the institutions right.”  In the West there is a rich literature devoted to 
what makes institutions right or wrong in terms of fostering growth, dating from at least 
the time of Adam Smith and on down through Ronald Coase (1988, 1992), Douglass 
North (1990,1995; North and Thomas 1973), Dani Rodrik (2007), and many others.
2  The 
set of institutional arrangements that came to be labeled the “Washington Consensus” 
(Williamson 1990) was an attempt to specify a list of ten institutional arrangements that 
would optimize economic growth.  However, the relatively poor results of those countries 
(particularly in Latin America) that tried to follow the Washington Consensus formula 
most closely (see Rodrik 2008; Stiglitz 2008) has led to considerable doubt about this 
particular development formula and has raised new questions about whether it is possible 
or useful to try to specify what institutions are good for growth. 
On the other side of the globe, China for more than three decades has compiled a 
record of very impressive economic growth, a record that has transformed the face of that 
society, substantially reduced mass poverty, and created the second largest economy in 
the  world.    This  record  poses  a  challenge  for  conventional  analyses  of  economic 
development, since in a number of key respects the growth strategy pursued by Deng 
Xiaoping and his colleagues seems to have involved “getting key institutions wrong.”  It 
is these departures from conventional generalizations about economic development that   2 
have led to a variety of attempts to specify a “Beijing Consensus,” an alternative and 
perhaps more successful set of institutions and policies for promoting growth in poor 
countries (e.g., Ramo 2004). 
In what ways has China’s strategy for development since 1978 contradicted the 
conventional view?
3  In multiple ways, among which two departures are highlighted in 
most  discussions:  the  continuing  strong  role  of  the  state  in  guiding  economic 
development in China and the relative absence of secure private property rights.  On the 
latter  point,  Acemoglu,  Johnson,  and  Robinson  (2005:  395)  define  good  economic 
institutions as “those that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access 
to economic resources to a broad cross-section of society.”  Those authors and many 
others  assume  that  good  economic  institutions,  so  defined,  are  necessary  in  order  to 
produce the kinds of ambition, effort, risk-taking, skill-acquisition, and innovation from 
economic actors high (e.g., managers, entrepreneurs, inventors) and low (e.g., ordinary 
workers and farmers) that will translate into robust growth.  However, China over the last 
three decades has been characterized not only by weak private property rights, but also by 
sharply  increased  inequalities  and  manifestly  unequal  opportunities.    For  example, 
Chinese farmers still do not have full legal title to the land they farm, and if they migrate 
to the cities in search of work, their rural or agricultural registration status (hukou) brands 
them as members of a subordinate caste, not entitled to multiple kinds of services and 
benefits  enjoyed  by  possessors  of  urban  hukou  (see  Whyte  2010a).    Given  these 
seemingly  “bad”  institutions,  how  can  we  explain  China’s  extraordinary  growth 
trajectory?   3 
In this chapter I do not focus much on the role of the state or on property rights 
issues  per  se.    Instead  I  focus  on  inequality  trends  in  contemporary  China  and  their 
implications for the motivations and productivity of ordinary Chinese citizens.  Based 
upon this analysis, it is my contention that, at least regarding patterns of inequality and 
opportunity, China’s experience does not require us to abandon conventional formulas in 
favor of a new set of prescriptions for growth, whether a Beijing Consensus or otherwise.  
Instead  we  need  to  consider  Chinese  institutional  arrangements  today  against  the 
backdrop of the arrangements that prevailed in the last stages of China’s socialist planned 
economy.  Viewed in this light, property rights and opportunity structures in China today 
should be viewed as “sub-optimal” rather than “bad,” while at the same time as vastly 
improved compared to the very poor institutions of the late-Mao era.
4  I will draw on 
evidence from China national surveys colleagues and I carried out in 2004 and 2009, 
focusing on popular attitudes toward inequality in China and comparisons with other 
societies, to support my claim that current opportunity structures in China are compatible 
with the kinds of high citizen motivations needed for economic development. 
 
Market reforms and trends in social inequality 
There is another kind of conventional wisdom (in addition to neo-liberal theorizing about 
good institutions) that merits discussion before I launch into my own analysis.  There is a 
considerable  body  of  commentary,  both  within  China  and  outside,  that  stresses  the 
harmful and destabilizing nature of the inequality trends unleashed by China’s market 
reforms.  I refer to this as the “social volcano” scenario (see Whyte 2010b).  According to   4 
this analysis, the benefits of China’s reforms, in terms of high growth rates and improved 
average  living  standards,  are  in  the  popular  mind  offset  by  the  sharp  increases  in 
inequality that have occurred.  (Figure 1.1 plots the trends in the Gini coefficients of 
income  distribution  for  China  and  selected  other  countries  in  recent  years,  showing 
China’s sharp rise in income inequality.)  Most Chinese are assumed in this scenario to be 
increasingly angry about rising inequality and to believe that most of the gains of the 
reforms are being monopolized by the already rich and powerful.
5  This anger, in turn, is 
assumed to foster nostalgia for the perceived greater equality that prevailed at the end of 
the socialist era under Mao.  It is also often asserted that large portions of the Chinese 
population are being left out of the new wealth and opportunities created in the reform 
era, and that those who are most left behind (e.g. farmers, migrants, residents of interior 
provinces, etc.) are particularly angry.  A final element in the social volcano scenario is 
the prediction that concentrated anger about current inequality patterns and trends will at 
some point explode into widespread protests that may destabilize China’s political order. 
 
(Figure 1.1 about here) 
 
If these assumptions of the “social volcano” scenario are correct, then China’s rapid and 
sustained economic growth since 1978 is hard to explain.  A sullen and angry population 
that feels that new opportunities are being monopolized by the rich and powerful, and 
that yearns for the perceived greater fairness of Mao-era socialism, would not seem to 
provide the human energy that is so widely visible in China today.  Our survey work in   5 
China in recent years reinforces this skepticism.  Based upon our data, I conclude that the 
various elements of the social volcano scenario are misleading or dead wrong, resulting 
in my labeling of this scenario as a myth (Whyte 2010b).  In the next section I present 
selected survey responses that provide the basis for my rejection of the social volcano 
scenario.  By the same token, I interpret these survey data as providing support for my 
claim  in  this  paper  that  current  popular  attitudes  in  China  are  compatible  with,  and 
conducive toward, the human efforts and energy needed for economic growth, despite the 
continued existence of “suboptimal” institutions. 
 
China surveys on inequality and distributive injustice 
More than a decade ago, it became apparent that a great deal of research on trends in 
objective  inequality  in  China  had  been  conducted  and  published  (see,  for  example, 
Griffin and Zhao 1993; Khan and Riskin 2001), but that no surveys had been carried out 
on Chinese citizen attitudes toward the inequality patterns spawned by market reforms.  
In collaboration with colleagues, I directed a pilot survey in Beijing on inequality and 
distributive justice attitudes in 2000, and then two China national surveys, in 2004 and 
again in 2009, to learn how ordinary Chinese citizens view current inequalities.
6  The 
results presented here come mostly from the 2004 China national survey, but they are 
followed by a brief update based upon the 2009 follow-up survey.   
In  designing  these  China  surveys,  we  made  use  of  the  fact  that  surveys  on 
attitudes toward inequality and distributive justice issues had already been carried out in 
other countries, so that by replicating in China questions from these earlier surveys, we   6 
would be able to compare Chinese popular attitudes on inequality issues with those of 
citizens in other societies.  In particular, we became aware of the International Social 
Justice Project (hereafter ISJP) surveys that had been conducted in the 1990s in a number 
of East European post-socialist societies, as well as in a few advanced capitalist societies 
(see Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995; Mason and Kluegel 2000).  Below comparative 
data from the ISJP surveys are used to put the 2004 China survey responses in context.
7   
The  2004  China  Survey  on  Inequality  and  Distributive  Justice  Attitudes  used 
spatial  probability  sampling  (see  Landry  and  Shen  2005)  to  identify  and  interview  a 
nationally representative sample of 3267 Chinese adults between the ages of 18 and 70, 
with  a  response  rate  of  about  75%.
8  By  using  our  results  to  examine  how  ordinary 
Chinese citizens feel about a range of inequality and distributive justice issues, and by 
comparing  their  views  with  their  counterparts  in  other  societies,  and  particularly  in 
Eastern Europe, we can gain some insight into whether they feel that opportunities in 
China  are  widely  available  and  fairly  distributed  versus  being  scarce  and  unfairly 
monopolized by the advantaged few. 
 
China’s current inequalities: how fair or unfair? 
No  single  question,  measure,  or  even  attitude  domain  can  capture  how  citizens  of  a 
society feel about the fairness versus unfairness overall of current inequalities and the 
opportunity structures they reflect.  So in our China surveys (as in ISJP and other earlier 
surveys) we used a variety of different questions to probe perceptions and preferences   7 
regarding  various  aspects  of  inequality.    We  consider  in  sequence  some  of  our  key 
indicators, first for China alone, and then in comparative perspective. 
 
Too Much Inequality? 
First, how do our survey respondents feel about the gap between rich and poor in Chinese 
society today?  We asked our China respondents three questions—about the income gaps 
in  the  country  as  a  whole,  in  their  work  unit,  and  among  their  neighbors,  with  the 
response  categories  in  each  case  being  “too  large,”  “somewhat  large,”  “about  right,” 
“somewhat small,” and “too small.”  In Figure 1.2 we can see that for China as a whole, a 
substantial majority of respondents - 71.7% - said that current income gaps are too large.  
However,  when  viewed  in  relation  to  responses  on  the  other  two  questions,  Chinese 
citizens do not seem all that angry about current income gaps.  The other two questions 
concern local inequalities - within the respondent’s work unit and among their neighbors 
-  and  on  these  questions  a  majority  of  respondents  (49.9%  and  56.1%)  said  current 
income gaps are appropriate.  Furthermore, if we compare Chinese attitudes with those of 
citizens in other societies, as shown in Table 1.1 (only for national income gaps, as the 
other two questions were not asked in the ISJP surveys), it turns out that a substantial 
majority in all the ISJP countries surveyed felt that national income gaps were excessive.  
And the percentage of Chinese who held this view (71.7%) is among the lowest, with 
only Americans in 1991 (65.2%) and Poles in the same year (69.7%) slightly less likely 
to view current national income gaps as too large.  At the other end of the scale, about 
95% of both Bulgarians and Hungarians in 1996 said that national income gaps were too   8 
large.  From these figures it is clear that Chinese citizens do not stand out as particularly 
angry about current income gaps, especially when we consider that the most meaningful 
comparisons people make are with others in their immediate social environment, and not 
with distant billionaires and celebrities.
9 
 
(Figure 1.2 and Table 1.1 about here) 
 
Does Upward Mobility Depend upon Merit? 
Since a sense of the fairness versus unfairness of current inequalities is not so much a 
matter of the size of the gaps, but more of who is rich and who is poor, and whether 
people got to their current positions due to merit or not, we followed ISJP in asking a 
series of questions regarding how survey respondents would explain why some people 
are poor and why some others are rich.  We first presented respondents with a series of 
possible explanations for why some people are poor, including both merit explanations 
(e.g.  lack  of  talent,  not  working  hard,  or  insufficient  education)  and  non-merit 
explanations (e.g. unequal opportunity, discrimination, unfair economic system), and then 
we followed this with a similar list of possible explanations for why some people are rich.  
In each instance we asked the respondent to judge the relative importance of a specific 
explanation  of  current  poverty  (or  wealth),  with  the  responses  being  “very  large 
influence,” “large influence,” “some influence,” “small influence,” or “no influence at 
all.”  We present the Chinese responses in Figures 1.3 and 1.4, with the most widely 
stressed explanations at the top of each chart, and the least emphasized at the bottom.   9 
(Figures 1.3 and 1.4 about here) 
 
It is immediately apparent from these charts that Chinese survey respondents are much 
more likely to explain who is currently rich versus poor in terms of variations in merit 
than in terms of the unfairness of the social and political order.  These results clearly 
imply  that  the  majority  of  our  survey  respondents,  and  therefore  we  may  presume  a 
majority of Chinese adults, accept the view that education, hard work, and talent are 
likely to lead to improved living standards and even wealth, while those who remain poor 
or fall into poverty should mainly blame their own failings, rather than an unfair social 
order within which they have to live and compete. 
How  do  these  attributions  of  poverty  versus  wealth  look  in  comparative 
perspective?  In Tables 1.2 and 1.3 we display the comparable figures from our survey 
and selected ISJP countries (education was not included in the explanations of poverty 
and wealth in the ISJP surveys).  These comparative figures make the Chinese response 
patterns even more striking.  Across the board, China is an outlier in terms of viewing the 
current patterns of who is poor versus rich even more than citizens in other countries in 
terms  of  variations  in  merit.    In  other  words,  even  in  comparison  with  citizens  in 
advanced capitalist societies, Chinese view the current gaps between rich and poor as 
relatively more fair. A rough ranking of countries along a continuum from fair (i.e. merit-
based) to unfair (non-merit, structural discrimination) inequalities is as follows: 
Fair China Japan Advanced Capitalism Eastern Europe Unfair   10 
Once again our results fly in the face of the contention that many if not most Chinese see 
current structures of inequality and opportunity as unlikely to reward meritorious efforts 
and thus as unfair.   
 
(Tables 1.2 and 1.3 about here) 
 
It is certainly not the case, however, that Chinese survey respondents view all current 
inequalities as fair.  We included in our survey a set of questions about the fairness versus 
unfairness of various kinds of current discrimination against migrants and individuals of 
rural  origin,  as  enforced  through  China’s  hukou  system.    Because  these  institutional 
arrangements are a unique feature of Chinese society, we do not have any comparable 
ISJP responses with which to compare them.  But the response patterns in Figure 1.5 
make it obvious that a substantial majority of China survey respondents disapprove of all 
of these forms of discrimination against rural people and migrants.  Furthermore, more 
detailed examination indicates that urbanites (i.e., those who possess urban hukou) are as 
much or more likely than villagers or migrants to say that these kinds of discrimination 
are unfair (details not shown here; see the discussion in Whyte 2010b, Chapter 8). So 
here is a key feature of current inequalities that our survey respondents see as very unfair, 
rather than fair.  However, it is important to note that the hukou system and the patterns 
of discrimination based upon it are not a product of China’s market reforms and post-
socialist transition, but instead are a legacy of China’s socialist era that persists to the 
present  (see  Wang  2005;  Whyte  2010a).    It  seems  likely  that  these  kinds  of   11 
discrimination are viewed as unfair by most survey respondents precisely because they 
classify and treat people differently based upon where they were born, rather than based 
upon their individual talents and diligence.  These results challenge two key features of 
the  “social  volcano”  scenario  -  the  claims  that  socialism  under  Mao  was  a  highly 
egalitarian social order and that Chinese citizens today are nostalgic in general for the 
greater equality of that era. 
 
(Figure 1.5 about here) 
 
Ample or Scarce Opportunities to Get Ahead? 
The  final  domain  of  survey  responses  to  be  considered  here  concerns  feelings  of 
optimism versus pessimism about the opportunities currently available to improve one’s 
living standard and social status.  We have a variety of measures available in our 2004 
China survey that bear on this issue.  First, we asked survey respondents whether they 
thought that the proportion of Chinese who are poor would increase, remain about the 
same,  or  decrease  in  the  coming  five  years,  and  we  followed  this  up  with  the  same 
question about the proportion of Chinese who are rich.  As shown in Figure 1.6a, the 
most common responses were that the proportion of poor Chinese would decrease (43.2% 
gave this response) and that the proportion of rich would increase (61.1%).  We also 
asked them about what they thought their own family’s living standard would be five 
years from now, with five response categories: much worse, somewhat worse, no change,   12 
somewhat better, much better.  Again the majority view was quite optimistic, with 63.1% 
predicting improvement and only 7.5% expecting deterioration (see Figure 1.6b).   
 
(Figures 1.6a, 1.6b, 1.6c about here) 
 
Figure 1.6c displays patterns of responses to four more general statements presented to 
respondents, in each case asking them to respond using a 5 point scale ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree: “Based upon the current situation in the country, the 
opportunities  for  someone  like  you  to  raise  their  living  standard  are  still  great;” 
“Currently, the opportunities to be successful are the same for all people;” “People with 
different family backgrounds encounter different opportunities in society;” and “In our 
country, hard work is always rewarded.”  In regard to the second question (opportunities 
are equal) opinions are divided, with neutral responses most common, and only slightly 
more  respondents  agreeing  (37.5%)  than  disagreeing  (30.9%).  When  the  same  basic 
question was asked the other way around (in the third question in Figure 6c), a majority 
of  respondents  (59.5%)  recognized  that  family  backgrounds  influence  future 
opportunities.    However,  the  responses  to  the  other  two  statements  are  again  more 
optimistic.  Overall 56.8% of respondents agree that the opportunities to get ahead in 
China today are still great, while 61.1% agree with the dubious statement that hard work 
is always rewarded.   
The responses to the “equal opportunities exist” and “family background affects 
opportunities”  questions  indicate  that  most  respondents  recognize  that  China  is  not  a   13 
society characterized by equality of opportunity.
10  However, the responses to the other 
two questions in Figure 1.6c indicate that most Chinese also do not view competition for 
upward  mobility  as  a  zero-sum  game.    Even  if  some  individuals  who  have  special 
advantages are more likely than others to get ahead and become rich (and are less likely 
to fall into poverty), a reality acknowledged even in the responses displayed in Figures 
1.3 and 1.4, their advantages are not seen as substantially affecting or diminishing the 
chances for ordinary Chinese citizens to get ahead through talent and effort.
11   
Once again we can compare many of these Chinese responses with the views of 
respondents in the ISJP surveys.  Tables 1.4a-1.4c display the comparative figures.  It is 
obvious, first, that fewer Chinese expect the proportion of their fellow citizens in poverty 
to  increase  than  in  any  of  the  other  countries  displayed  in  the  table,  while  a  higher 
proportion  of  Chinese  expect  the  proportion  of  their  fellow  citizens  who  are  rich  to 
increase (Table 1.4a).  We only have responses to the question about expectations for the 
respondent’s own family’s standard of living five years later for a few countries, but 
compared with the few East European countries in which this question was asked, a much 
higher percentage of Chinese (63.1% versus 20+%) say they expect to be doing better 
five  years  later  (Table  1.4b).    Only  two  of  the  four  questions  used  in  Figure  6c  are 
available  in  the  ISJP  surveys,  and  they  show  a  mixed  picture  (Table  1.4c).    The 
percentage of Chinese who feel that equal opportunities exist (37.5%) is higher than in 
any of the East European countries surveyed, but roughly comparable to the figures for 
West  Germany,  Japan,  and  the  UK,  and  substantially  below  the  quite  unrealistic 
responses from Americans (65.9%).  However, in regard to whether hard work is always   14 
rewarded, Chinese respondents are again off the scale with 61.1% agreeing, far ahead of 
all the other ISJP countries, whether advanced capitalist or post-socialist.  Overall, China 
survey  responses  in  2004  indicate  that  in  most  respects  Chinese  viewed  current 
inequalities  more  favorably  than  their  counterparts  in  Eastern  European  transitional 
societies, and that they were generally as approving and sometimes more so even when 
compared with citizens in advanced capitalist societies.  The high degree of acceptance of 
current  patterns  of  inequality  and  optimism  about  mobility  opportunities  are  striking 
characteristics of Chinese citizen attitudes, contradicting claims that strong feelings of 
distributive injustice are widespread in that society.
12 
 
(Tables 1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4c about here) 
 
Social Contours of Distributive Injustice Feelings in 2004 
One other surprising finding emerging from the 2004 survey was that the conventional 
wisdom about in which social groups, and within which locales, we would find the most 
anger  about  rising  inequalities  was  incorrect.    Based  upon  analyses  in  the  “social 
volcano” vein and media phrases such as “the pitchfork anger of peasants” (Time Asia 
2006), one would expect to find respondents at or near the bottom of China’s social 
hierarchy  to  be  particularly  critical  of  current  inequalities,  while  successful  and  high 
status respondents would have more positive views.  However, what we actually found 
was almost the opposite.  On some, but not all, of our inequality attitude measures, rural 
respondents, and those still engaged in farming in particular, expressed more acceptance   15 
of current inequalities than favored urbanites, while within urban areas the well educated 
(and also middle aged respondents) tended to be somewhat more critical.  The detailed 
findings that lead to these conclusions are too complicated to present here (but see Han 
and Whyte 2008; Han 2009; Whyte 2010b), but this pattern of differences serves as an 
important clue that will be used later to help answer the puzzle of how China has been 
able to achieve such rapid growth despite sub-optimal institutions. 
 
Did Popular Attitudes Change between 2004 and 2009? 
My colleagues and I are still in the early stages of analyzing the data from the 5-year 
follow-up China national survey we carried out in 2009, and I will not present here a 
systematic comparison of the two surveys.
13  Instead I will content myself with two broad 
but tentative generalizations.  Initially as we planned the follow-up survey, we expected 
that the global financial crisis would have serious effects on China’s economic growth 
rate and employment numbers, and that as a result Chinese survey respondents in 2009 
might display more critical attitudes about current inequalities.  There were some events 
that  reinforced  this  expectation,  such  as  the  reported  dismissal  of  about  20  million 
workers in export-oriented factories early in 2009.  However, as we all know by now, 
China’s leaders reacted to the global crisis with a huge financial stimulus package and 
other energetic efforts to keep the economic boom going, and China suffered much less, 
and recovered more robustly, than most other countries on the globe.   
That reality is reflected in my first generalization based upon comparing popular 
attitudes in 2004 and 2009: While 2009 respondents were a bit more critical in their   16 
views on some questions about current inequalities, their views on other aspects were 
much the same or even more favorable.  On balance there was no sign of any overall 
increase  in  anger  about  distributive  injustices.    And  in  the  domain  of  views  about 
opportunities to get ahead, 2009 responses tended to be more optimistic than in 2004.  
For example, the percentage of respondents who expected their families to be better off 
five  years  later  increased  from  61.7%  to  73%,  while  the  percentage  who  agreed  or 
strongly agreed with the statement that “hard work is always rewarded” went up from 
61% to 65.5%.
14  Obviously China’s “social volcano” (purportedly fueled by anger about 
inequality trends) was still dormant in 2009. 
The second tentative generalization to emerge from comparison of results from 
the two China surveys is that the social contours of distributive injustice attitudes have 
altered in subtle but important ways.  Most importantly, on many of our measures the 
tendency in 2004 for China’s rural citizens to have more positive attitudes about current 
inequalities than their urban counterparts is no longer so apparent in 2009.  However, in 
most instances the reason for the convergence of rural and urban attitudes on these issues 
is not because rural respondents in 2009 were more angry than their counterparts five 
years earlier.  Rather, for the most part the tendency in 2004 for urbanites to express 
somewhat  more  critical  attitudes  on  inequality  issues  has  diminished,  producing 
convergence toward the more positive rural attitude levels.  While my colleagues and I 
are still pondering the meaning of these altered attitude contours, on balance we see no 
evidence from our surveys that popular attitudes toward current inequality patterns are   17 
turning more critical in recent years, either for the sample as a whole or for particular 
social groups or locales. 
 
Popular attitudes and economic growth: the chicken versus egg problem 
At this point it is logical to ask whether I have made any progress in solving the puzzle of 
how Chinese sub-optimal institutions can promote rapid economic development?  After 
all, I have been presenting evidence about citizen opinions regarding current inequalities 
from  two  surveys  conducted  26  and  31  years  after  China’s  market  reforms  were 
launched.  Isn’t it very likely that the profile of attitudes discussed here (the egg) is 
caused by China’s robust economic growth (the chicken), rather than being a major cause 
of that growth (the egg coming before the chicken)?  It is virtually certain that China’s 
successful growth and improved living standards are major reasons for the accepting and 
optimistic views revealed in both surveys.  However, in the remaining pages of this paper 
I  make  a  case  that  causation  is  likely  reciprocal,  and  that  positive  motivations  and 
attitudes  of  Chinese  citizens  have  contributed  to  China’s  economic  boom.    In  other 
words, the popular attitudinal egg likely also contributed to the robust economic growth 
chicken. 
Since there were no comparable attitude surveys conducted in China in the late 
1970s and I lack a time machine to go back and correct that omission, I can’t know for 
sure what Chinese attitudes were like at the time that market reforms were launched in 
1978.  However, I attempt here somewhat speculatively to present an account of the 
institutional changes that have occurred in China since before the revolution and their   18 
likely impact on citizen attitudes toward inequality and social mobility issues.  In this 
account  I  argue  that  through  successive  institutional  changes  in  the  Mao  era,  the 
contradiction  between  the  institutions  that  monitored,  rewarded,  and  promoted 
individuals  vis-a-vis  prevailing  popular  attitudes  about  schooling,  work,  and  social 
mobility  became  not  just  sub-optimal,  but  worse  and  worse  (and  worse  than  the 
counterpart disjunction in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the time), and that the 
post-1978 market reforms substantially reduced, even if it did not totally eliminate, this 
contradiction.    This  return  to  closer  compatibility  between  citizen  orientations  and 
institutionalized  opportunity  structures,  I  contend,  helps  to  explain  a  major  part  of 
China’s  economic  success  after  1978.    The  analogy  that  comes  to  mind  is  of  a 
compressed spring, with human talent and energy increasingly suppressed in later stages 
of Mao’s rule, but now released once again. 
 
China’s Traditional Legacy 
No brief discussion can do justice to the complexity of the stratification structures of late-
Imperial  and  Republican  China.    However,  several  key  features  are  central  to  my 
analysis.  First, although the gap between rich and poor was very large, for the most part 
it was a society “open to talent,” without inherited caste, aristocratic, or other status 
barriers.  (For a stylized depiction of the inequality hierarchy in late-Imperial China, see 
Figure  1.7)
15  In  that  social  order  individuals  from  poor  and  humble  origins  faced 
daunting odds, but they were not prohibited from, and sometimes did succeed in, vaulting 
upward  in  social  status  and  wealth,  whether  through  schooling,  commerce,   19 
entrepreneurship, or even banditry or good luck (see Chow 1966).  By the same token, 
downward mobility was also common, with families having to struggle to avoid losing 
out to competitors and falling into poverty.  This open but competitive environment, 
when  combined  with  high  emphasis  on  schooling  and  centuries  of  familiarity  with 
money, commercial contracts, and other economic transactions, produced a widespread 
sharing of “economic literacy” and strong drives to get ahead even among uneducated 
villagers.  As Thomas Rawski (2007: 103) speculates, “Take two populations of children 
with  similar  distributions  of  intelligence  and  access  to  schooling.    One  population  is 
reared in Chinese villages: the other, in some other cultural venue (medieval Europe, 
contemporary Bihar or Bangladesh) at a similar level of economic development.  The 
hypothesis is that, upon maturity, the former population will display a stronger array of 
market skills and accomplishments than the latter.”
16  The third point is that before 1949, 
in  those  unusual  periods  in  which  China  was  at  peace  and  enjoyed  relatively  good 
governance, the country was able to achieve respectable economic growth rates.  Thomas 
Rawski,  once  again,  makes  this  case  for  the  Republic’s  Nanking  decade,  1927-37 
(Rawski 1989).  In other words, given a suitable institutional environment, the social 
capabilities and human energies of ordinary Chinese would foster economic growth. 
 
Mao Era - The Early Years, 1949-57 
The prolonged warfare, social chaos, and runaway inflation of the years between 1937 
and 1949 made it difficult for many Chinese to figure out how to survive, much less plan 
for the future and get ahead.  In most respects the situation changed for the better after the   20 
CCP came to power in 1949.  National political order was secured, inflation was rapidly 
brought  under  control,  and  ambitious  expansions  in  schooling,  health  care,  industrial 
development,  and  government  employment  were  launched.    Members  of  prior  elite 
classes were victimized, but for most of the population the opportunities to get ahead 
were much more available and predictable than before.
17  Millions of villagers poured 
into  the  cities  seeking  employment,  and  the  combination  of  economic  rehabilitation, 
Soviet-assisted  key  industrial  projects,  and  the  vast  expansions  of  government 
employment required by the soon-to-be socialist state created abundant opportunities for 
Chinese  of  humble  origins  to  get  educated,  become  urban  residents,  and  gain  higher 
status and more secure employment.  Education at all levels expanded rapidly, and the 
increase in university places made it relatively easy for students who graduated from 
upper middle school to go on to college in the mid-1950s (Unger 1982).   
Until near the end of this period, China retained a mixed economy, with medium 
and small scale private businesses and family farms still predominating, while in the not-
yet-dominant state sector, the influence of the Soviet model led to reliance on material 
incentives, bonuses, and other standard socialist remuneration practices.  As a result, 
most of the population in these early years operated within a fairly positive institutional 
context in which incentives and opportunities existed that fairly predictably rewarded 
diligent study and hard work as well as political enthusiasm.
18  China’s overall economic 
performance was also strong during this period.  Discounting the initial recovery period, 
the  rate  of  economic  growth  in  the  years  1952-57  has  been  variously  estimated  as 
between 6 and 8 percent annually (Yeh 1973).  Although this is below the average of the   21 
post-1978 period, it is nonetheless an impressive record.  Although the contribution to 
this performance of institutions designed to motivate Chinese citizens to study and work 
hard may be debated, it seems clear that those institutions did not constitute an obstacle to 
economic recovery and growth during this early period of CCP rule. 
 
Mao Era - Later Years and Increased Obstacles, 1958-77  
From 1958 onward, China’s situation changed in dramatic fashion.  Two cataclysmic 
eruptions launched by Mao, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, created 
new and escalating obstacles to the kind of citizen motivations needed for economic 
development. Taking the Leap first, the initial optimism generated by official propaganda 
was followed by a devastating economic collapse and mass famine, and these effectively 
short-circuited  or  even  reversed  the  chances  for  getting  ahead  for  most  (surviving) 
Chinese.
19  Multiple kinds of basic changes were involved.  Urban firms expelled to the 
countryside some 20 million newly hired rural migrants (Murphey 1980), many urban 
employees and workers had their wages frozen for the two decades that followed, and 
tight  rations  and  persistent  hunger  became  regular  features  of  urban  life  (Whyte  and 
Parish 1984).  Substantial segments of relatively privileged urban work organizations 
(e.g. coastal factories, universities) and their employees and dependents were forcibly 
relocated into interior and often remote locales under the “third front” defense campaign 
launched in 1964 (Naughton 1988).  In the countryside the options of migration to the 
city or engaging in a family business were closed off, and for the next two decades 
Chinese  villagers  essentially  became  “socialist  serfs,”  bound  to  the  soil  in  people’s   22 
communes and required to concentrate their energies on collectivized agricultural labor.  
University  enrollment  levels  were  cut  back  sharply  even  as  the  number  of  youths 
graduating from upper middle school kept increasing, leading to ever-sharper competition 
among  students  for  scarce  opportunities  to  attend  college  (Shirk  1982;  Unger  1982).  
Even after recovery from the Great Leap famine, the overall opportunity structure had 
deteriorated so substantially that many if not most Chinese mainly tried to figure out how 
to endure and hold on to whatever resources and status they had, rather than planning 
how to get ahead. 
At first glance it might appear that the Cultural Revolution, for all of its political 
sound and fury, was less damaging to China’s economic prospects than the Great Leap 
Forward.  However, during the period from 1966-77, Cultural Revolution reforms were 
systematically  enacted  and  enforced  that  upended  the  institutions  for  rewarding  and 
promoting individuals that had previously existed under both Chinese petty capitalism 
before 1949 and under Chinese socialism prior to 1966.  These institutional changes 
departed  sharply  from  conventional  socialist  remuneration  practices  followed  in  the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, practices that were branded as “revisionist” by Mao.  
After 1966 in urban work organizations, material incentives, production bonuses, and all 
prizes, royalties, and similar stimuli were abolished, and workers and employees were 
expected to be motivated by moral incentives as they labored for the same set wages 
month after month.   
Insofar as social equality was the goal, it was pursued by “leveling down” to the 
lowest  common  denominator,  rather  than  by  programs  designed  to  redistribute   23 
advantages from the rich to the poor.  Even the very modest personal displays of status 
and  advantage  that  existed  before  1966  were  abolished  (including  signs  of  rank  on 
military uniforms).  Not only the political targets of the Cultural Revolution, but millions 
of urbanites were forcibly reassigned to a variety of rural exiles, including intellectuals 
and cadres sent to “May 7
th cadre schools” to engage in labor and 17-18 million urban 
“intellectual youths” who were rusticated to people’s communes and state farms.  The 
result in urban areas was very far from social equality, however, since sharp differences 
in resources and rewards across work units and urban locales remained and perhaps even 
increased (see Walder 1984; Bian 1994).  What upward mobility occurred largely took 
the form of political climbing, with obscure rural leaders (e.g. Chen Yonggui) and factory 
workers (e.g. Wang Hongwen) promoted “helicopter style” into the highest leadership 
ranks, although such upward mobility was swamped by the much more numerous cases 
of former elites who were purged, exiled, imprisoned, or killed.      
Within the educational system, the use of exams, grades, and other markers of 
academic  quality  and  suitability  for  additional  schooling  was  denounced  and  largely 
abandoned; the curriculum was diluted to emphasize political study, military training, and 
labor practice as much as or more than academics; and direct entry into college after 
upper middle school graduation via national examinations was eliminated.  Universities 
effectively ceased to produce any new graduates for about seven years (1966-73), and 
even when universities reopened after 1970, they enrolled fewer students than prior to the 
Cultural Revolution, and much less than prior to the Great Leap Forward.
20  Although the 
reform of the procedures for selecting students for college was intended to give greater   24 
chances to the offspring of ordinary worker, peasant, and soldier families, in fact the 
combination of the prolonged campus shutdown (1966-70) and then much lower student 
enrollments almost certainly produced an actual decrease in the opportunities for youths 
from disadvantaged families to go to college after 1966.  Once they graduated, the former 
“worker,  peasant,  soldier”  college  students  were  expected  to  return  to  their  prior 
communities and work units, rather than using their college educations to gain higher 
status and pay.  These institutional arrangements in education constitute a thoroughgoing 
repudiation  of  the  educational  institutions  and  expectations  that  had  been  bedrock 
foundations of China’s social order for centuries. 
In the countryside the prohibitions on geographic mobility and non-farm activities 
that had been enforced since 1958 were maintained, but after 1966 new restrictions were 
added.  The prevailing “time rate” and “piece rate” work point incentive systems that had 
been in place since collectivization in 1955-56 to reward differential effort and skill in 
farming were criticized, and localities were encouraged to replace them with the “Dazhai 
work point system,” in which individuals went to work in the collective fields and then 
submitted to periodic meetings in which fellow peasants discussed who should get a little 
more or a little less (Parish and Whyte 1978).  Even on their collective fields farmers 
were discouraged from growing crops and animals to suit local conditions and market 
demands  and  were  instead  under  pressure  to  emphasize  achieving  self-sufficiency  in 
grain production (Lardy 1985).  Regular attempts were made to discourage the vestigial 
household private economic activities that Chinese collectivized agriculture, following 
Soviet practice, had allowed since the mid-1950s.  Too much time and energy spent on   25 
private  plots  and  animals  was  subject  to  criticism,  efforts  were  made  to  limit  the 
frequency with which nearby markets met, and villagers were strictly forbidden from 
taking produce or handicrafts into nearby cities to sell.  Rural factories were required to 
only  produce  goods  (e.g.  farm  tools,  cement)  that  were  needed  locally,  and  not  for 
markets elsewhere in China, much less overseas.  Rural factories were supposed to pay 
their  workers  no  more  than  what  local  brigade  members  could  earn  from  daily 
agricultural  labor.    So  in  villages  as  well  as  in  the  cities,  Cultural  Revolution-era 
institutions were designed to prevent anyone from rising above their neighbors through 
their own individual or family economic efforts and ingenuity, again a “leveling down” 
mandate.  However, it is important to keep in mind again that the result was very far from 
an  egalitarian  society.    China’s  villagers,  who  still  constituted  about  80%  of  the 
population in 1978, were consigned to an inferior caste status and bound to the soil, with 
their  living  standards,  access  to  benefits,  and  opportunities  in  life  more  and  more 
diverging from those of favored urbanites (Potter 1983; Whyte 1983). 
In  sum,  by  the  end  of  the  Mao  era,  China  had  a  transformed  inequality  and 
opportunity structure, and the implications of that structure for motivating the talents, 
efforts, and creativity of ordinary Chinese were very negative.  The post-1962 Maoist 
obsession with classes and class struggle led to draconian efforts through the Cultural 
Revolution  reforms  to  limit  income  differences  and  displays  of  social  status  within 
particular communities and work units, but at the same time the very substantial and in 
some instances widening income and opportunity gaps between work units, localities, 
and regions, and between city and countryside, were basically ignored.  Reforms in wage   26 
systems,  rural  work  points,  marketing  systems,  university  enrollment,  and  much  else 
conveyed the message that each Chinese citizen was expected to exert maximum effort to 
benefit the state and society, but without expecting any rewards or increased access to 
opportunities or improved status for themselves and their families.  And they lived in a 
highly contentious and uncertain atmosphere of mysterious and apparently continuous 
political campaigns and struggles in which downward mobility seemed more likely than 
any movement upward in social status.   
It is worth stressing once again that this late Mao-era interpretation of socialism 
was different in key respects from socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at 
the time.  In those societies workers who surpassed planned quotas received bonuses and 
promotions, students crammed for college entrance exams that put them on a path to a 
university education and high status state jobs, employees could quit their jobs in a state 
firm to seek a better job elsewhere, and even collective farmers received higher earnings 
if they performed better than their neighbors (as well as being able to sell extra produce at 
collective  farm  markets  in  the  cities).    All  of  these  conventional  forms  of  socialist 
“distribution according to contributions” were branded “revisionism” by Mao and his 
radical colleagues, who tried after 1966 to systematically eliminate comparable practices 
from Chinese society.   
When  looking  back  on  this  systematic  “leveling  down”  effort,  I  find  myself 
asking, “What was Mao thinking?”  In other words, in an extraordinary civilization that 
lasted for millennia by constructing institutions that allowed virtually all Chinese families 
to mobilize their energies and ingenuity to compete and try to rise up in an open but very   27 
unequal society, and in which a cultural emphasis on both commerce and education was 
deeply imbued in families and communities throughout the realm, how could Mao think 
that it made sense to require each citizen and family to abandon all concern for success 
and advancement to simply serve at the beck and call of the state?  Regardless of his 
motivations, it seems clear now that the altered institutions that ordered citizen lives at 
the time Mao died in 1976 were very “bad” in terms of their ability to foster the human 
motivations conducive to economic development.
21 
 
Market Reforms 
It is in the context of the prevailing “bad” institutions at the end of the Mao era that the 
reforms enacted after 1978 (actually, starting in 1977 with repudiation of the Cultural 
Revolution reforms in schooling and the revival of university entrance exams), even if in 
key respects “sub-optimal,” nonetheless constituted something like a new “liberation” for 
most  Chinese  citizens.    The  specific  institutional  changes  are  quite  familiar  (see  the 
discussion in Harding 1987; Naughton 1995; Naughton 2007; Brandt and Rawski 2008), 
and only a brief listing of key changes will be offered here.   
In  the  countryside  agriculture  was  de-collectivized  through  the  household 
responsibility  system,  reviving  family  farming  and  family  strategizing  about  how  to 
compete and get ahead.  Restrictions on marketing rural produce were relaxed not only in 
nearby periodic markets, but also in the cities, and by the mid-1980s the roads leading 
into every large city were clogged each dawn with all manner of conveyances bringing 
produce and handicrafts (including even cart-drawn pool tables for newly opened city   28 
pool parlors) to urban consumers.  Migration restrictions were relaxed, enabling large-
scale rural to urban migration, almost entirely blocked since 1960, to resume.  The ban on 
private business activity was also lifted, enabling entrepreneurial villagers to both gain 
ownership of existing collective firms (e.g., former brigade enterprises, later township 
and village enterprises) or to start their own new businesses, either to meet local needs, to 
produce  for  the  city  population,  or  even  to  make  goods  for  export  overseas.    These 
multiple  new  (actually  revived,  since  all  had  precedents  in  the  years  prior  to 
collectivization  in  1955)  possibilities  and  the  substantial  reductions  in  poverty  and 
improved living standards and health that they made possible help explain the unusually 
favorable rural views about current inequality patterns noted earlier in this paper.  Even if 
Chinese villagers face sub-optimal constraints in realms such a land-ownership and thus 
are  objectively  not  as  favorably  positioned  to  compete  for  success  as  their  rural 
counterparts elsewhere in East Asia (Greenhalgh 1989), their liberation from socialist 
serfdom provided a major human engine of China’s post-1978 development (see also Nee 
1985; Nee and Su 1990). 
Perhaps the most striking direct experience with sub-optimal institutions involves 
the 130 million plus (at any one point in time recently) migrants who have flooded into 
cities in search of work and better lives.
22  As migrants they faced a daunting array of 
discriminatory rules and limitations, some of them noted in Figure 1.5.  In addition to 
retaining the lower caste status indicated by their agricultural and non-local hukou, they 
have generally been barred from employment in many desirable occupations, unable to 
enroll their children in city public schools (unless they pay special high fees, at least until   29 
recently),  and not entitled to a wide range of housing and social benefits enjoyed by 
urbanites.  They also often work under sweatshop conditions, lack medical insurance 
coverage and can be fired if injured or ill, may be subject to abuse and harassment by 
their employers, and tend to get blamed for crime, congestion, and other urban problems.  
Even if they are doing the same job as someone with an urban hukou, they are viewed, 
and tend to view themselves, as different and of lower status (a mingong is not the same 
as a gongren; for further discussion, see Whyte 2010a; Yan 2008.)   
Despite these disadvantages, millions of former villagers continue to stream into 
cities  all  over  the  country  in  search  of  opportunity,  and  these  migrants  provide  vital 
contributions to China’s economic boom.  For example, urban construction, commerce, 
domestic service, and manufacturing for export are largely driven by migrant labor, and 
without their presence a major city such as Shenzhen would still be a sleepy train depot 
surrounded by farmland.  Although they are subject to very inferior treatment compared 
to their urban hukou fellow citizens, most do not compare themselves with urbanites, but 
instead with fellow migrants and with relatives and friends back in the village.  They also 
are fully aware of the fact that in the 20 year period after 1960, migration from village to 
city was forbidden, making the category of rural migrant virtually nonexistent.  They also 
know that, despite the uncertainties, competition, and abusive conditions of migrant labor 
in the cities, they have many more opportunities and can earn significantly more than if 
they remained in their village and engaged in farming.  Migrants can and often do change 
jobs and cities, and the option of returning to their native village always remains open as 
well (see Murphy 2002), with some returnees marrying and settling down in their home   30 
villages and perhaps using their urban experiences and social ties to start a new business, 
rather than contenting themselves with farming.  In short, compared to the “socialist 
serfdom”  of  the  commune  era,  most  migrants  value  their  new  and  expanded 
opportunities, even though they continue to suffer from institutionalized discrimination. 
In the cities the post-1978 changes involving the restoration of, and creation of 
new, structures of opportunity and mobility were also dramatic.  The Cultural Revolution 
taboos on material incentives and bonuses were repudiated, rationing was cut back and 
then eliminated as produce and consumer goods flooded into markets, and conspicuous 
consumption became fashionable again, rather than politically dangerous.  State firms 
were not subject to rapid privatization, unlike the situation in the former Soviet Union 
and  Eastern  Europe,  but  were  instead  initially  subjected  to  more  modest  reforms, 
including  instituting  personnel  and  promotion  institutions  emphasizing  educational 
credentials and work performance, while also allowing firms to re-orient their production 
to the market and use a substantial portion of any increased earnings to meet the needs of 
their employees, including for wage increases and additional housing.  At the same time, 
restrictions  on  private  and  foreign  firms  were  relaxed,  allowing  multiple  new  firms 
outside  of  the  state  sector  to  arise  and  meet  employment  and  consumption  needs  of 
Chinese urbanites and to sell their products overseas.  A labor market began to re-emerge, 
with some individuals leaving the security of state employment to “go down into the sea” 
(xiahai) of market competition by starting or seeking employment in a non-state business.  
This strategy of preserving reformed state firms while relying increasingly on the non-
state  sectors  for  new  economic  growth,  dubbed  “growing  out  of  the  plan”  by  Barry   31 
Naughton (1995), produced a positive trajectory through the mid-1990s that Lau, Qian, 
and Roland (2000) refer to as “reform without losers.”   
Only after the mid-1990s, under the stern mandate of then-Premier Zhu Rongji, 
did the sorts of widespread firm bankruptcies, layoffs of state workers, and other major 
flows of downward mobility experienced in other post-socialist societies ensue, but by 
then  almost  two  decades  of  rapid  economic  growth  and  the  emergence  of  major 
employment options outside the state sector made “reform with some losers” arguably 
somewhat more palatable.  These more mixed fates of urbanites in the years immediately 
prior to our 2004 survey likely explain why our urban survey respondents in that year 
were somewhat more critical than their rural counterparts, despite still enjoying very 
large advantages in life.
23 
Other institutional changes in the reform era also opened up multiple opportunity 
channels.  A combination of purges of Cultural Revolution radicals and new mandatory 
retirement rules for officials produced a huge overhaul and expansion of the state and 
party bureaucracy, allowing the well educated and technocrats to move swiftly upward in 
the ranks.  Wholesale privatization of urban housing starting in the mid-1990s created 
another set of institutional stimuli for economic competition.  While most urbanites took 
advantage of housing reforms simply to gain legal title to the apartments they already 
lived in, some used their new housing assets to engage in market activity, buying extra 
properties  for  rental  or  sale  or  even  launching  commercial  and  residential  property 
development companies, the source of some of the most fabulous personal and family 
fortunes in China today.   32 
On the education front the repudiation of Cultural Revolution educational policies 
after 1977 was followed by newly intensified competition by Chinese parents to get their 
children (increasingly, their only child - see Fong 2004) prepared for exams to get into 
the best schools at lower levels and then through the restored national college entrance 
exams into a high prestige university (or even better recently, into a foreign prep school 
and/or  overseas  college).    Beyond  academics,  multiple  other  paths  to  success  and 
mobility attracted the attention of youth and their parents, including athletics, music, and 
drama.    Although  as  elsewhere  in  East  Asia,  the  competition  among  the  young  for 
success is often very intense, a combination of declining fertility and vastly expanded 
university enrollments since 1998 makes it much easier today than in the late Mao era for 
urban youths to obtain a college education.
24   
This listing of institutional changes since 1978 is far from complete, but it should 
suffice  to  convey  the  argument  of  this  paper.    Among  the  many  changes  China’s 
reformers  introduced,  the  effort  to  construct  and  rebuild  incentive  and  opportunity 
structures  in  order  to  motivate  and  reward  Chinese  citizens  high  and  low  for  effort, 
creativity, and productivity has occupied a central place (for more discussion see Whyte 
2009).
25  The sorts of reforms listed here can be seen as motivated by a desire to find a set 
of institutions that are congruent with long-standing (but suppressed and discouraged 
during the late-Mao era) orientations of Chinese families to seek and take advantage of a 
range of available opportunities to better their lot in life.  Mao had propagated the dogma 
that society could only progress and prosper by preventing individuals and families from 
pursuing  their  own  selfish  interests,  a  notion  that  had  some  resonance  with  ascetic   33 
versions  of  Confucianism.    However,  Deng  Xiaoping  and  his  reformist  colleagues 
rejected this idea in favor of a rival notion that finds justification in day-to-day neo- 
Confucian statecraft as well as, in the West, in the writings of Adam Smith - that by 
enabling individuals and families maximum opportunity to pursue their own immediate 
interests and improve their lives, in the long run society will benefit by becoming more 
prosperous and politically stable.
26  Although we lack that time machine to be certain 
how  average  Chinese  citizens  initially  felt  about  the  renewed  opportunities  to  enrich 
themselves made possible by post-1978 reforms, the extraordinarily energetic response to 
the altered institutions and policies, particularly as displayed by the rapid improvement in 
agricultural production and rural incomes in the early 1980s (where increases of around 
7% a year were registered for a few years) seems to indicate that Mao’s effort to sell his 
notion  of  “smash  selfishness,  establish  the  public”  (posi  ligong)  did  not  make  much 
popular headway.  Instead, as in the compressed spring analogy mentioned earlier, many 
if not most Chinese likely harbored a strong desire to be able to improve their own lives 
and  the  lot  of  their  families  (while  also  perhaps  benefiting  society),  and  when  the 
reformed market institutions made that increasingly possible again after 1978, the popular 
response was rapid and enthusiastic.  Although it may be hard to quantify, I contend that 
this response is a major force underlying China’s dramatic growth since 1978, even in the 
absence of optimal economic institutions. 
 
Can  the  momentum  provided  by  sub-optimal  institutions  be 
maintained?   34 
I  have  argued  here  that  the  substantial  closing  after  1978  of  a  sharp  contradiction--
between popular attitudes and mobility desires on the one hand and Cultural Revolution-
era  economic  institutions  on  the  other--unleashed  suppressed  human  energies  and 
ingenuity on a massive scale, even if key post-1978 institutions remained in certain key 
instances sub-optimal.  In closing this chapter I want to speculate about whether this 
source of China’s growth will continue to be important in the future.   
If the arguments of this chapter are correct, then the answer to this question is, 
unfortunately for China, probably not.  It seems logical to assume that the acceptability of 
sub-optimal institutions depends upon their being seen as improvements on what came 
before, even if still imperfect.  And the primary comparisons discussed in this paper are 
with the situation that prevailed just prior to 1978 as a result of Cultural Revolution 
reforms  and  policies,  which  I  have  characterized  as  very  bad  for  China’s  growth 
potential.  Since the Cultural Revolution is fading in the memories of even older Chinese, 
with  most  students  and  younger  members  of  the  labor  force  today  having  no  direct 
experience with life in that era, the power of that comparison must be weakening steadily 
with the passage of time.   
For young Chinese it is logical to assume that the more relevant question is not 
how things today compare with the late-Mao era, but whether the institutional order in 
which they currently live and compete provides more fairness and opportunity to get 
ahead than was the case a few years ago (or is regressing and becoming more unfair).
27  
In  other  words,  to  adopt  the  phrasing  used  by  Yasheng  Huang  in  his  recent  book, 
Capitalism  with  Chinese  Characteristics  (2008),  do  ordinary  Chinese  perceive  that   35 
current institutions are characterized by “directional liberalism” - i.e. by a fairly steady 
improvement in incentives and opportunities for ordinary citizens?  In his book Huang 
argues  that  the  directional  liberalism  of  the  1980s  largely  evaporated  in  the  1990s, 
producing  increasingly  unfairly  distributed  opportunities  monopolized  by  urbanites  in 
general, and by urban elites and leading state firms in particular.  From the evidence of 
our national surveys I am skeptical of Huang’s pessimistic claims, particularly since we 
found ordinary Chinese very optimistic in 2004 about their families doing better in the 
future and even more optimistic in 2009.  However, I agree with Huang that in order for 
China to maintain high rates of growth, it is important for Chinese citizens to remain 
convinced that their society is relatively fair and getting better over time. 
China’s leaders in recent years seem aware of the need to take energetic steps to 
improve the opportunity structures of Chinese society.  From Jiang Zemin’s campaign to 
“develop the West” through Hu Jintao’s advocacy of a “harmonious society,” major new 
initiatives  have  been  launched  designed  to  make  China’s  growth  more  equitable  and 
thereby to persuade the population that opportunities are expanding and becoming more 
widely shared.  While it is debatable how much in these new programs is aimed at public 
relations as opposed to actually perfecting institutions and removing injustices, in some 
instances these new programs have made a major difference.  For example, the excess 
burden of local taxes and fees afflicting villages and inciting popular protests in the 1990s 
(see Bernstein and Lu 2003) was largely eliminated by tax and fee reforms at the end of 
that decade,
28 grain taxes and rural tuition fees for mandatory schooling were abolished   36 
more recently, and new village medical insurance plans were constructed after 2004 that 
today cover most of the rural population.
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However, it is also obvious that much still needs to be done to combat the sub-
optimal  features  that  may  diminish  China’s  future  economic  dynamism.    In  the 
countryside efforts have been made over the years to provide greater security of farmer 
claims to the land they farm, and even in some instances to allow hiring of farm labor and 
renting of land to others.  However, the continuing lack of legally defensible private 
ownership of farmland makes difficult or impossible transactions that are common in 
other societies (e.g. using land as collateral for loans to improve farming operations or to 
start a new business) even as villagers in many parts of China feel powerless to prevent 
their  land  allotments  from  being  lost  to  developers  through  shady  deals  with  local 
officials. 
For China’s tens of millions of urban migrants it is also a matter of some progress 
but a long way to go.  For close to two decades the rank unfairness of the hukou system 
has been increasingly recognized in policy discussions and in China’s media, and there 
have been repeated calls to reform and eventually abolish institutionalized discrimination 
against migrants.  However, after each proud announcement that the hukou system is 
being abolished (see Wang 2010; Chan and Buckingham 2010), it becomes clear that 
things  have  only  changed  around  the  edges,  while  pervasive  discrimination  against 
migrants remains substantially intact.  For example, formal city regulations prohibiting 
the hiring of migrants in a large range of occupations are now formally abolished, but 
pervasive bias against hiring migrants continues (see Guang and Kong 2010).  Similarly,   37 
migrant children are now supposed to be able to attend regular urban public schools 
without having to pay special high fees, but they still face numerous obstacles.  Getting 
access to housing in a neighborhood where a migrant family wants to send their child to 
school is very difficult, given preferences for urban hukou-holders in the housing market.  
Even if a migrant child is admitted to an urban public school, he or she is likely to be 
tracked into a separate and lower-status achievement track and to be treated more poorly 
by teachers and school administrators.  And even if he or she completes lower middle 
schooling in a city school, that is the end of the compulsory schooling period, and the 
child is supposed to return to the parental hukou village in order to continue into upper 
middle school (and is only allowed to sit for the college entrance exam in the origin 
place, not alongside his or her urban classmates; see Xiong 2011).  In short, despite some 
improvement, when it comes to getting ahead via schooling, migrant children are far 
from having equal opportunity with their urban-hukou counterparts.
30 
China has done quite well economically for more than three decades with an 
improved  but  still  in  significant  ways  sub-optimal  set  of  institutions  and  incentives.  
However, in order to sustain robust growth into the future, it seems likely, and it appears 
that China’s leaders recognize, that further reforms are needed to improve institutional 
fairness and provide better incentives for growth.  This is not a story of China having 
developed  a  successful  alternative  growth  model,  Beijing  Consensus  or  otherwise.  
Rather it is a story of sub-optimal institutions that initially powered growth but are likely 
losing their potency and acceptability over time.  It remains to be seen whether China’s   38 
leadership is up to the challenge of introducing the important but difficult institutional 
reforms needed to optimize the conditions for future economic growth. 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1  Paper  prepared  for  “China’s  Economic  Dynamics  and  its  Impacts  on  the  World 
Economy: A Beijing Consensus in the Making?” University College, Dublin, Ireland, 
July 14-15, 2011. Thanks to Dong-Kyun Im for assistance with charts and tables for 
this paper. 
2 One of the most systematic treatments of the role of institutions in development can be 
found in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005. 
3 See my discussion of several paradoxes of China’s development record in Whyte 2009. 
4 Making the same kind of temporal contrast, Walder and Oi (1999) refer to the “utility of 
suboptimal solutions.”  
5 For example, a recent New York Times report (Kahn 2006) stated, “Because many 
people believe that wealth flows from access to power more than it does from talent or 
risk-taking,  the  wealth  gap  has  incited  outrage  and  is  viewed  as  at  least  partly 
responsible for tens of thousands of mass protests around the country in recent years.”  
6 The 2000 Beijing pilot survey was conducted in order to test whether a survey focusing 
on attitudes toward distributive justice and injustice issues was too sensitive a topic to 
be feasible, which turned out not to be the case.  The PRC collaborator in all three 
surveys has been the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, 
directed by Shen Mingming, with the assistance of Yang Ming and Yan Jie.  My 
project collaborators for the various projects have also included Jieming Chen, Juan   39 
                                                                                                                                               
Chen, David Featherman, Chunping Han, Pierre Landry, Xiaobo Lu, Albert Park, and 
Wang Feng, and I have been assisted in analyzing the data by a large number of 
graduate students at Harvard.  Major funders of the surveys have included the Institute 
for Social Research at the University of Michigan, the Smith Richardson Foundation, 
and the Harvard China Fund, with additional support provided by internal university 
sources at Harvard, the University of California at Irvine, and Peking University.  I am 
solely responsible for the interpretations offered in this chapter.   
7 The ISJP carried out surveys in both post-socialist and advanced capitalist countries in 
1991, another round of surveys only in selected East European post-socialist societies 
in  1996,  and  then  again  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  and  Germany  (separate 
surveys in East and West) in 2005-2006.  David Mason, Duane Alwin, and Bernd 
Wegener from the ISJP team provided advice and assistance as we developed our 
China surveys.  Only selected ISJP country results are displayed in this paper.  In each 
table only the figures for the most recent ISJP survey in which a question was asked 
are shown for each country. 
8  Spatial  probability  sampling  is  a  technique  designed  to  replace  traditional  China 
sampling based upon household registration records, since the latter are increasingly 
inaccurate due to population mobility.  Spatial probability sampling involves using 
population  density  estimates  and  maps  to  randomly  select  actual  geographical 
coordinates and then interview one adult per household within every de facto address 
found within a designated square around each such coordinate.  The sampling points 
for the 2004 survey were located in 23 of China’s 31 provincial administrative units.   40 
                                                                                                                                               
9  This  generalization  explains  why  I  may  covet  the  nicer  office  down  the  hall  of  a 
colleague, but I don’t get very angry about the outrageous wealth being accumulated 
by Bill Gates, Lady Gaga, or Kobe Bryant.   
10 Obviously equality of opportunity is a goal or ideal that is not realized in any modern 
society, and it is open to debate whether China’s departure from this ideal is greater, or 
less, than other societies. 
11 The 2004 survey included a direct question asking whether the respondent believed 
that some people getting rich reduced or increased the chances of other people getting 
rich.  In response, 48.6% said they thought it increased the chances of others getting 
rich, while only 11.1% said they thought it decreased the chances (with the other 
40.3% responding it was hard to say).  In other words, more than four times as many 
survey respondents favored a non-zero sum as a zero sum view on competition for 
wealth in China today. 
12 The findings should not be interpreted to mean that ordinary Chinese are satisfied with 
all aspects of the social order in which they live.  Our survey focused on distributive 
justice issues, and we did not inquire about procedural injustices, such as abuses of 
power, inability to counter unfair treatment from local officials, and so forth.  In other 
publications from our project we contend that the rising tide of Chinese mass protest 
activity recently in almost all instances involves procedural justice grievances, not 
distributive justice complaints and envy of the rich.   41 
                                                                                                                                               
13 The 2009 national cross-sectional survey followed the same sampling design as the 
2004 survey and ended up with a modestly reduced response rate and sample size 
(2967 versus 3267). 
14 The percentages for 2004 given here differ slightly from those in Figure 1.6 because 
slight  changes  in  sampling  between  the  two  surveys  required  the  use  of  a  new 
sampling weight calculation for this comparison. 
15 This figure was developed by the late G. William Skinner for use in his classes on 
Chinese society and kindly shared with students and colleagues, including the present 
author.  It is reproduced here with the permission of his estate. 
16 For other accounts of the distinctive pro-growth culture of pre-revolutionary China, see 
Arkush 1984; Gates 1996; Harrell 1985. 
17 In the jargon of social stratification research, most of the increased upward social 
mobility in this early period was structural (produced by economic and bureaucratic 
expansion) rather than circulation (produced by new elites replacing previous elites). 
18 In contrast, China’s surviving capitalists were attacked and humiliated in the “5-anti” 
campaign  of  1951-52  and  then  increasingly  hemmed  in  by  state  regulations  and 
controls even before the socialist transformation campaign was launched in 1955.  So 
these  economic  elites  were  substantially  deprived  of  the  incentives  for  effort, 
innovation, and getting ahead still enjoyed by much of the rest of the population. 
19 The short-circuiting during the Leap of prior institutions for rewarding and promoting 
labor is only one of many sources of that disaster and won’t be discussed here.  My   42 
                                                                                                                                               
focus is on the years after 1962 when, despite substantial recovery, the institutions for 
providing incentives and rewards were less favorable than prior to 1958. 
20 In 1975 there were 501,000 college students enrolled nationally, in comparison with 
674,000 in 1965 and 962,000 in 1960, so total university enrollment was cut almost in 
half  over  this  15  year  stretch.    As  a  developing  society  with  declining  university 
enrollments  (as  of  1975,  not  since),  China  is  highly  unusual  and  possibly  unique.  
Enrollment data are available at www.chinaonline.com. 
21 While the Chinese economy did continue to grow at modest rates during the early 
1970s, that growth was largely “extensive” and inefficient growth, achieved primarily 
by high rates of savings and state investment, rather than “intensive” growth achieved 
through rising efficiency and productivity.  And the depressed levels of household 
consumption that were required in order to sustain high levels of state investment in 
the economy aggravated the motivation and morale problems of the economic system. 
22 Recent estimates of the number of migrants in China are much larger, in the range of 
240-250 million or even more. 
23 The fact that large scale layoffs from state enterprises were mainly concentrated in the 
years between 1998 and 2003 and that more recently that experience has not been 
repeated while urban average incomes and home ownership have surged may help 
explain why in the 2009 survey we found urban respondents generally less critical 
than their counterparts five years earlier. 
24 In 1995 there were 2.9 million college students enrolled in Chinese universities; by 
2008 there were over 20 million (see Whyte 2010b; p. 229), with some recent visitors   43 
                                                                                                                                               
reporting  figures  now  around  30  million.    This  expansion  has  overwhelmingly 
benefited urban youths, who occupy most of the increased college places (see Guo 
2009).    It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  unprecedentedly  rapid  expansion  of 
college enrollments in China since 1998 has produced a new and increasingly serious 
problem - unemployed and underemployed and resentful college graduates, referred to 
as the “ant tribe” (yizu). 
25  Although  the  restoration  and  enhancement  of  incentives  and  mobility  channels  for 
individuals has been emphasized in this paper, equally or even more important was the 
reform-era effort to create and increase incentives for firms and local governments.  
The  competitive  energies  unleashed  at  both  the  individual  and  collective  levels 
contributed to China’s economic dynamism, and even sub-optimally organized firms 
performed surprisingly well, such as in the massive expansion of TVEs (township and 
village enterprises) in the 1980s.  See the discussion in Oi 1999; Oi and Walder 1999. 
26 One of Deng’s most widely cited aphorisms was, “Some people in rural areas and cities 
should be able to get rich before others” (a 1983 quotation cited in Whyte 2010b: 1). 
27 I am suggesting that we have in China a dramatic instance of what Albert Hirschman 
(Hirschman and Rothschild 1973) called the “tunnel effect” in the course of economic 
development.  Poor citizens observing others getting rich before them are like drivers 
stuck together in a tunnel, says Hirschman.  If an adjacent lane starts moving, initially 
they do not get angry, but in fact feel relieved and hopeful.  However, if this situation 
goes on for too long, and if many others leave the tunnel while they still remain stuck, 
that relief can eventually turn into outrage at the unfairness experienced.   44 
                                                                                                                                               
28 In our 2004 survey, about 70% of rural respondents reported that the local taxes and 
fees they currently paid had declined compared with three years earlier. 
29 According to data from our 2004 and 2009 surveys, rural coverage by public medical 
insurance increased dramatically during this period, from 15% to almost 90%, thus 
leaping ahead of urban coverage rates (which increased from 51% to 75% during this 
period),  although  how  much  is  actually  covered  is  no  doubt  lower  in  rural  areas.  
Despite these and other reforms and improvements, the trend toward rising national 
income inequality has not been reversed, at least yet, according to survey data from 
2007 (see Li and Sicular 2011). 
30 On another front, according to our survey data, the proportion of migrants covered by 
public medical insurance improved dramatically between 2004 and 2009 - from 9% to 
56% - but still lagged far behind the coverage rates of villagers and urbanites (see note 
29). 
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    Table 1.1 Views on extent of inequality (large + too large, %) 
  China 
2004 
Russia 
1996 
Bulgaria 
1996 
Hungary 
1996 
Czech R. 
2006 
E. Germ. 
2006 
Poland 
1991 
U.S. 
1991 
G. 
Britain 
1991 
W. 
Germ. 
2006 
Japan 
1991 
National income gaps  71.7  86.3  95.6  94.9  84.8  88.6  69.7  65.2  75  78.4  72.6 
 
Source: 2004 China survey and selected International Social Justice Project Surveys (see 
Whyte 2010b, Chapter 4 for details) 
 
   Table 1.2 Attribution of why people in their country are poor (important + very important, %) 
  
  
China 
2004 
Russia 
1996 
Bulgaria 
1996 
Hungary 
2005 
Czech R. 
2006 
E. 
Germ. 
2006 
Poland 
1991 
U.S. 
1991 
G. 
Britain 
1991 
W. 
Germ. 
2006 
Japan 
1991 
  Lack of ability  61.3  28.0  26.7  30.8  28.8  26.6  34.8  35.2  32.8  36.5  25.7 
  Bad luck  26.9  28.4  38.7  28.2  31.5  24.6  32.0  15.2  22.1  26.2  24.6 
  Loose morals  31.2  74.0  43.1  54.0  43.8  43.9  75.3  41.7  33.4  44.4  63.1 
  Low efforts  54.0  39.1  35.6  28.5  45.3  32.0  42.8  47.8  34.9  44.0  62.0 
  Discrimination  21.2  40.8  23.0  27.0  22.3  40.4  11.1  36.4  31.5  31.4  22.8 
  Unequal opportunity  27.5  61.2  76.6  43.6  41.7  56.6  46.4  33.4  36.0  41.7  23.1 
  Economic structure  21.0  72.6  88.0  63.2  44.6  71.9  65.2  44.9  48.1  44.6  36.2 
 
Source: 2004 China survey and selected International Social Justice Project Surveys (see 
Whyte 2010b, Chapter 4 for details)
 
   Table 1.3 Attribution of why people in their country are rich (important + very important, %) 
  
  
China 
2004 
Russia 
1996 
Bulgaria 
1996 
Hungary 
2005 
Czech R. 
2006 
E. 
Germ. 
2006 
Poland 
1991 
U.S. 
1991 
G. 
Britain 
1991 
W. 
Germ. 
2006 
Japan 
1991 
  Ability  69.5  48.3  34.1  42.0  54.5  51.8  46.0  59.7  53.9  59.5  65.1 
  Good luck  39.1  40.5  60.5  47.2  41.4  44.2  37.4  24.6  33.9  45.1  57.5 
  Dishonesty  17.4  74.1  82.4  48.1  64.9  43.0  62.4  42.9  35.5  33.3  27.8 
  Hard work  61.8  38.1  48.9  26.5  53.5  50.0  32.0  66.2  60.2  62.5  48.4 
  Connections  60.0  84.1  89.3  82.5  80.0  81.8  72.7  75.0  76.3  76.4  49.3 
  More opportunity  45.3  55.3  82.3  80.1  58.2  75.6  55.8  62.5  64.7  71.1  54.4 
  Unfair econ. struct.  26.0  72.7  77.5  65.5  57.8  57.4  52.2  39.4  44.5  35.6  53.0 
 
Source: 2004 China survey and selected International Social Justice Project Surveys (see 
Whyte 2010b, Chapter 4 for details) 
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   Table 1.4a Expected changes in the proportion of people who are rich/poor (increase, %) 
  
  
China 
2004 
Russia 
1996 
Bulgaria 
1996 
Hungary 
1996 
Czech R. 
1996 
E. 
Germ. 
1996 
Poland 
1991 
U.S. 
1991 
G. 
Britain 
1991 
W. 
Germ. 
1991 
Japan 
1991 
  Poor trend in 5 years  26.1  47.9  75.1  77.4  n.a.  79.6  74.5  69.0  58.0  43.1  37.2 
  Rich trend in 5 years  61.1  41.5  32.4  42.3  n.a.  45.1  57.9  29.1  34.5  46.3  36.7 
   Table 1.4b Expectation for the family’s living standard 5 years later (somewhat better + much 
better, %) 
  
  
China 
2004 
Russia 
1996 
Bulgaria 
1996 
Hungary 
1996 
Czech R. 
1996 
E. 
Germ. 
1996 
Poland 
1991 
U.S. 
1991 
G. 
Britain 
1991 
W. 
Germ. 
1991 
Japan 
1991 
Family income  
in 5 years  63.1  22.0  20.5  21.1  n.a.  22.3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
   Table 1.4c Optimism vs. pessimism about social mobility (agree + strongly agree, %) 
  
  
China 
2004 
Russia 
1996 
Bulgaria 
1996 
Hungary 
2005 
Czech R. 
2006 
E. 
Germ. 
2006 
Poland 
1991 
U.S. 
1991 
G. 
Britain 
1991 
W. 
Germ. 
2006 
Japan 
1991 
Equal opportunities 
  exist  37.5  22.8  7.1  11.9  31.2  20.3  25.5  65.9  41.8  31.8  38.1 
  Hard work rewarded  61.1  10.7  2.8  25.9  22.7  34.7  8.5  37.4  18.7  47.0  16.6 
 
Source: 2004 China survey and selected International Social Justice Project Surveys (see 
Whyte 2010b, Chapter 4 for details) 
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Figure 1.1: Gini Coefficient Trends in China and Selected Countries 
Source: United Nations University, World Inequality Database Version 2.0c, available 
online at http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/ 
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Figure 1.2: Popular Views on Extent of Inequality 
Source: 2004 China National Survey on Inequality and Distributive Justice Attitudes
 
 
Figure 1.3: Attribution of Why People in China are Poor 
Source: 2004 China National Survey on Inequality and Distributive Justice Attitudes 
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Figure 1.4: Attribution of Why People in China are Rich 
Source: 2004 China National Survey on Inequality and Distributive Justice Attitudes 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Attitudes toward Urban Bias 
Source: 2004 China National Survey on Inequality and Distributive Justice Attitudes 
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Figure 1.6a: Expected Change in Size of Poor and Rich 
Source: 2004 China National Survey on Inequality and Distributive Justice Attitudes 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6b: Expectation for the Family’s Living Standard 5 Years Later 
Source: 2004 China National Survey on Inequality and Distributive Justice Attitudes 
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Figure 1.6c: Optimism vs. Pessimism about Social Mobility 
Source: 2004 China National Survey on Inequality and Distributive Justice Attitudes 
 